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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Ricardo Javier Blanco, a citizen of Honduras, is a 
member of Honduras’s Liberty and Refoundation (“LIBRE”) 
Party, an anti-corruption political party that opposes the current 
Honduran president. After participating in six political 
marches, he was abducted by the Honduran police and beaten, 
on and off, for twelve hours. He was let go but received death 
threats over the next several months until he fled to the United 
States. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied all relief, and the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed.  
Blanco now petitions for review of the agency’s 
decision, arguing that the BIA and IJ erred in denying his 
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asylum and withholding of removal claims on the basis that his 
treatment did not rise to the level of persecution. He also argues 
that it was improper to require him to corroborate his testimony 
to prove his CAT claim. Because the agency misapplied our 
precedent when determining whether Blanco had established 
past persecution, and because it did not follow the three-part 
inquiry we established in Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 
554 (3d Cir. 2001), before requiring Blanco to corroborate his 
CAT claim testimony, we will grant the petition, vacate the 
BIA’s decision, and remand for further proceedings.  
I. Background 
A.  Blanco’s Experience in Honduras 
Ricardo Blanco is a citizen of Honduras. Beginning in 
2016, Blanco participated in six marches with the LIBRE 
Party, an anti-corruption political party. Blanco’s sixth march 
was on November 27, 2017, the day after Juan Orlando 
Hernández—whom the LIBRE Party opposed—won the 
presidential election. At that march, four Honduran police 
officers arrested Blanco, put a mask over his head, and took 
him to an abandoned house. They held him at the house for 
approximately twelve hours and beat him multiple times, for 
forty to sixty minutes each time. During the beatings, the police 
threatened to kill Blanco and his family and warned him not to 
participate in any further LIBRE Party marches. They also 
used racial slurs against Blanco. After the twelve hours, they 
left him in an abandoned lot. From there, he was taken to a 
hospital for evaluation. He did not have any bruises, cuts, or 
broken bones, and he was given acetaminophen and released. 
The next day, Blanco learned that other march 
participants had also been abducted by the police and at least 
one of them had been killed. He also heard from a neighbor 
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that the day after the march, while he was staying at his mother-
in-law’s house, the police entered his home to look for him. 
Blanco remained in Honduras for about fourteen 
months and did not participate in any further LIBRE Party 
activities. He moved from city to city, but the police continued 
to look for him and send him threats. Specifically, Blanco 
received three letters and a phone call warning him that 
because of his political views, he and his family would be 
killed if he did not leave Honduras. Blanco also learned that 
some of the LIBRE Party members who had participated in the 
marches had been killed after receiving similar letters. The last 
letter Blanco received was in December 2018, and in January 
2019, Blanco fled Honduras for the United States. His mother, 
young daughter, and daughter’s mother remain in Honduras 
and, so far as the record shows, have not been harmed. 
B. Procedural History 
Soon after leaving Honduras, Blanco was taken into 
custody by United States border patrol in Texas. Blanco 
informed border patrol that he was seeking asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The 
asylum officer who interviewed Blanco found his testimony 
credible. The Department of Homeland Security issued a 
Notice to Appear charging Blanco with removability as an 
alien who entered the United States without admission or 
parole and who has applied for admission but lacks an entry 
permit. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); id. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). 
Blanco then applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
CAT protection.  
The IJ denied Blanco’s application and found him 
removable. The IJ found Blanco’s testimony credible, stating 
that he was “mostly consistent” except that “his testimony 
regarding who sent the letters and made the phone call 
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threatening him” “appear[ed] to be speculation.” App. 45. 
Nevertheless, the IJ held that Blanco’s experiences did not rise 
to the level of past persecution on account of his political 
opinion or race because: (1) his “beating was not severe and 
did not end with any serious physical injuries,” and (2) the 
officers did not “follow up” on their threats and Blanco 
“remained in the country for 14 or 15 months after the 
November 2017 incident and was not harmed again.” App. 46. 
The IJ also found that Blanco did not establish a well-founded 
fear of future persecution because “it appear[ed] . . . that [the 
police] met their goal of preventing [Blanco] through 
intimidation from participating in any more political activities” 
and did not follow through on their threats. App. 47. Because 
Blanco did not establish that he was eligible for asylum, the IJ 
found that he necessarily failed to satisfy the higher standard 
for withholding of removal. 
Lastly, the IJ concluded that Blanco failed to meet his 
burden under the CAT because he did not establish that it was 
more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to 
Honduras. Blanco testified that his name was on an official 
government list of opposition members, but the IJ stated that 
there was “nothing in the Country Reports to corroborate this 
and [Blanco] ha[d] not provided any corroborating evidence.” 
App. 47. Additionally, the IJ pointed to the facts that the 
election is over and that Blanco remained in Honduras for 
fourteen months after his abduction and beating without being 
harmed. 
On appeal, the BIA affirmed. It concluded that the harm 
Blanco experienced was “more akin to harassment” than 
persecution. App. 7. The BIA also stated that Blanco had not 
established a well-founded fear of future persecution because 
he “ha[d] not shown that there is even a 10% chance that a 
person in his position, i.e., a mere supporter of the LIBRE 
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Party[,] who, nearly two years ago, participated in a few 
marches . . . w[ould] be persecuted upon his removal to 
Honduras.” App. 7. As to the CAT claim, the BIA reiterated 
that Blanco “ha[d] not presented any evidence which 
specifically corroborate[d] his own claimed fear.” App. 7. 
Blanco now petitions this Court to review the BIA’s decision. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The BIA had jurisdiction to review Blanco’s appeal 
from the IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). This 
Court has jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Ordinarily, this Court reviews only the 
BIA’s decision because it is the “final order[]” subject to 
appellate review. Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2009). But where, as here, the BIA “affirmed and partially 
reiterated” the IJ’s determinations, we review both decisions. 
Id. If the BIA relied on only some of the grounds given for 
denying relief, we review only those grounds. Id. 
“While we review for substantial evidence the 
[agency’s] factual findings, we review [its] legal 
determinations de novo, including both pure questions of law 
and applications of law to undisputed facts.” Herrera-Reyes v. 
Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
III. Analysis 
A. Blanco’s Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
Claims 
To establish asylum eligibility, a noncitizen must show 
that he is a “refugee” within the meaning of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A). 
A “refugee” is a person who is “unable or unwilling to return 
to” his home country because of past persecution or, in the 
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alternative, a well-founded fear of future persecution, on 
account of a protected ground—“race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
Id. § 1101(a)(42). The noncitizen must also show that the 
government in his home country either committed the 
persecution or was unable or unwilling to control the 
persecutor. Chen Yun Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d 
Cir. 2002), superseded on other grounds by 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
A noncitizen who applies for asylum automatically 
applies for withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.3(b). The 
Attorney General must grant withholding of removal to a 
noncitizen who shows a “clear probability” that his “life or 
freedom would be threatened” in his home country because of 
a statutorily protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 
Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2006). A “clear 
probability” means that persecution is “more likely than not.” 
Toure, 443 F.3d at 317 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). This standard is higher than the asylum standard; 
thus, an alien who fails to establish asylum eligibility 
necessarily fails to demonstrate a “clear probability” of 
persecution, as required for withholding of removal. Id.  
Blanco argues that the BIA and IJ erred in concluding 
that he did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear 
of future persecution to support his asylum and withholding of 
removal claims.1 We agree.  
 
1 The BIA and IJ focused on the persecution element of 
asylum, concluding that because Blanco failed to establish that 
he suffered past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 
persecution, he was not eligible for asylum. In terms of the 
second element—that the persecution is on account of one of 
 8 
 
1. Past Persecution 
To show that he is eligible for asylum because of past 
persecution, Blanco must demonstrate that what happened to 
him “rise[s] to the level of persecution.” Abdulrahman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Chen Yun 
Gao, 299 F.3d at 272). “[P]ersecution does not encompass all 
forms of unfair, unjust, or even unlawful treatment.” Chavarria 
v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 518 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citation 
omitted). “Rather, we have defined persecution as including 
‘threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions 
so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom.’” 
Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Lin v. I.N.S., 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
To determine whether an experience rises to the level of 
persecution, we must look at its “cumulative effect[,] . . . 
because taking isolated incidents out of context may be 
misleading.” Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 106 (citation and 
alternations omitted). Persecution may be “actual or 
threatened.” Id. “Even if one incident of mistreatment is not, in 
and of itself, severe enough to constitute persecution, a series 
of incidents of physical or economic mistreatment could, taken 
together, be sufficiently abusive to amount to persecution.” Fei 
Mei Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 2010).  
In this case, Blanco’s past harm includes the November 
2017 abduction and beating and the series of death threats that 
 
the statutorily protected grounds—the IJ stated that “this event 
may have been on account of his political opinion,” App. 46, 
and the BIA did not address the subject. Neither the IJ nor the 
BIA addressed the third element—whether the government in 
Honduras committed the persecution or was unable or 
unwilling to control the persecutor. 
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followed. The BIA and IJ misstated our precedent in three 
ways when determining whether this harm rose to the level of 
persecution: first, by requiring Blanco to show severe physical 
harm in order to establish past persecution; second, by 
requiring the death threats to be imminent; and third, by 
considering the beating and death threats separately. 
a. The Injury Did Not Need to be 
Severe 
This Court does not “condition[] a finding of past 
persecution on whether the victim required medical attention . 
. . or even on whether the victim was physically harmed at all.” 
Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 135, 145 (3d Cir. 2020). “We have 
never reduced our persecution analysis to a checklist or 
suggested that physical violence—or any other single type of 
mistreatment—is a required element of the past persecution 
determination.” Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 110. Nor do we 
“measure[]” the “severity of an injury” in “stitches.” Kibinda 
v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 113, 120 (3d. Cir. 2007). However, that 
is exactly what the BIA and IJ did here. The IJ stated that 
“[a]lthough [Blanco] was mistreated, . . . the beating was not 
severe and not did end with any serious physical injuries.” 
App. 46. The BIA agreed, noting that Blanco “required only 
Tylenol” to treat his physical injuries, “as opposed to stitches, 
surgery, or prescription medication.” App. 6.  
The IJ relied on our prior holding that “an isolated 
incident that does not result in serious injury does not rise to 
the level of persecution.” App. 32 (citing Voci v. Gonzales, 409 
F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005)). However, setting aside the fact 
that Blanco’s abduction and beating was not an isolated 
incident (it was followed by four death threats), we have never 
defined serious injury to mean serious physical injury. See, 
e.g., Doe, 956 F.3d at 145. 
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For example, in Chavarria v. Gonzalez, we held that 
death threats that “cause significant actual suffering or harm” 
are cognizable forms of persecution. 446 F.3d at 518, 520 
(internal quotation marks omitted). When Chavarria saw 
paramilitary forces attacking two members of a humanitarian 
organization that opposed the Guatemalan government, he 
came to their aid. Id. at 513. Soon after, his home was 
surveilled by the paramilitary forces. Id. Some time later, while 
driving at night, Chavarria was stopped, forced from his car, 
and robbed by individuals who pointed a gun to his head and 
warned him that “if we ever see you again, you’re not going to 
even live to tell the story.” Id. Chavarria’s request for asylum 
was denied. Id. at 515. The BIA concluded that he “failed to 
demonstrate past persecution, because there was never any 
specific threat of harm rising to the level of past persecution or 
any physical harm.” Id. We reversed, concluding that even 
though there was no evidence of physical harm, Chavarria’s 
death threat, in light of his experience of being forced from his 
car and robbed at gunpoint, rose to the level of persecution. Id. 
at 520.  
The Government attempts to distinguish Chavarria by 
saying that the threats to Blanco were “indirect . . . (via letter 
and telephone)” and that Blanco had “no bruises or cuts . . . 
[or] broken bones.” Resp’t’s Br. 19. However, Chavarria did 
not hold that threats must be made “directly” or in person to 
constitute persecution. Furthermore, like Blanco, Chavarria 
did not sustain bruises, cuts, or broken bones. In fact, he was 
not physically harmed at all, whereas Blanco was beaten—for 
hours. 
The Government argues that this case is more similar to 
Kibinda, where this Court held that petitioner’s five-day 
detention by the Angolan army and subsequent maltreatment—
having an object thrown at him so that he needed seven 
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stitches—was “far from unusual or extreme” and did not 
constitute past persecution. 477 F.3d at 117, 119. However, 
evaluating past persecution is not as simple as comparing the 
severity of each injury. Kibinda had provided no other 
objective evidence to demonstrate that the single injury was 
enough to constitute persecution. Id. at 119. Furthermore, we 
have since clarified that Kibinda did not “foreclose[] the 
possibility that outrageous conduct, even if limited to a single 
event without physical harm, could rise to the level of 
persecution, as was the case in Chavarria.” Doe, 956 F.3d at 
145 n.5. 
Thus, our precedent demonstrates that physical harm is 
not dispositive in establishing past persecution. The BIA and 
IJ erred in requiring that Blanco show physical harm, much less 
severe physical harm. 
b. Threats Need Not Be “Imminent,” 
But Rather “Concrete” and 
“Menacing” 
The BIA and IJ next erred by requiring that the threats 
Blanco received be “imminent,” in addition to “concrete and 
menacing.” This is not our standard for assessing whether 
threats are sufficiently serious to constitute persecution. We 
explained this point at some length in Herrera-Reyes. We 
noted that it is true that “we have sometimes used the phrase 
‘highly imminent, concrete and menacing.’” 952 F.3d at 108 
(quoting Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 520 (emphasis added)). 
“[M]ore frequently,” however, “we have used the terms 
‘concrete’ and ‘imminent’ interchangeably or in the 
disjunctive.” Id. That, we explained, “is with good reason: 
‘Imminence’ is a misnomer here.” Id. In actuality, “[w]e have 
neither required that the threat portend immediate harm nor 
that it be in close temporal proximity to other acts of 
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mistreatment.” Id. The key is not a threat’s imminence, but 
rather its likelihood, which is “subsumed in the inquiry as to 
whether the threat is ‘concrete.’” Id. For these reasons, we 
announced that we will “refer to the standard going forward 
simply as ‘concrete and menacing.’” Id.2  
“A threat is ‘concrete’ when it is not abstract or ideal, . 
. . but is corroborated by credible evidence.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A] threat is 
‘menacing’ where it show[s] . . . intention to inflict harm.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, “a threat that is 
‘concrete and menacing’ is simply one that—considered in the 
context of the full record—poses a severe affront to the 
petitioner’s life or freedom.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
Both the BIA and the IJ repeatedly emphasized that, 
despite the death threats, Blanco remained unharmed in 
Honduras for over a year. As is clear, however, a threat need 
not be acted on to constitute persecution. Herrera-Reyes, 952 
F.3d at 108. In a similar case to this one, where the threats were 
unfulfilled and the petitioner fled his home country, we wrote 
that “[t]o expect [a p]etitioner to remain idle in that situation—
waiting to see if his would-be executioners would go through 
with their threats—before he could qualify as a refugee would 
upend the fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law.” 
Doe, 956 F.3d at 144 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Indeed, if Blanco’s persecutors had followed through 
 
2 While Herrera-Reyes was not published when the IJ 
and BIA issued their decisions, we made clear there that we 
were not establishing a new rule, but rather clarifying the 
standard that our precedent has always required. 952 F.3d at 
108. 
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with their threats—as the BIA and IJ seem to suggest was 
necessary—Blanco would be dead. 
The threats Blanco received were both concrete and 
menacing. Others who attended the LIBRE Party march had 
been killed—and some of those victims had received 
threatening letters like Blanco’s beforehand. This demonstrates 
the “likelihood of the harm threatened.” See Herrera-Reyes, 
952 F.3d at 108. Furthermore, the threats were concrete 
because, as Blanco credibly testified, during the fourteen 
months after the November 2017 incident, he fled from city to 
city as the police continued to look for him. The threats were 
also “menacing” because they expressed the intention to kill 
Blanco and his family if he did not leave Honduras. 
Thus, the BIA and IJ erred by not applying the proper 
standard under our precedent in evaluating when threats suffice 
to establish persecution.  
c. Harm Must Be Considered 
Cumulatively 
Lastly, the BIA and IJ erred by failing to consider the 
aggregate effect of Blanco’s mistreatment. See Herrera-Reyes, 
952 F.3d at 109. In determining whether an asylum applicant 
suffered past persecution, the agency may not “take a single 
instance of mistreatment . . . from a larger pattern of abuse and 
confine its persecution analysis to the question of whether that 
single instance was, in and of itself, persecutory. Instead, 
incidents alleged to constitute persecution . . . must be 
considered cumulatively.” Fei Mei Cheng, 623 F.3d at 192 
(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). 
“Even if one incident of mistreatment is not, in and of itself, 
severe enough to constitute persecution, a series of incidents . 
. . could, taken together, be sufficiently abusive to amount to 
persecution.” Id. at 193. Thus, each incident must be “assessed 
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within the ‘overall trajectory of the harassment.’” Id. at 193 
(quoting Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 343 (3d 
Cir. 2008)). 
Moreover, “[a] cursory invocation of the word 
‘cumulative’ is insufficient”: “[e]ven if the [agency is] correct 
that no single incident in isolation rose to the level of past 
persecution, [it is] still required to analyze whether the 
cumulative effect of these incidents constituted a severe ‘threat 
to life or freedom.’” Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 109 (quoting 
Fei Mei Cheng, 623 F.3d at 192–93). In Herrera-Reyes, for 
example, the IJ erred “[b]y finding it dispositive that [the 
p]etitioner herself ‘was never physically harmed’ . . . and by 
failing to factor in the cumulative effect of the destruction of 
[her] home, the shooting of her convoy, the murder of her 
political compatriot, the armed robbery of the inauguration 
preparations, and the verbal death threat.” Id.  
There appears to have been a difference between what 
the BIA did and what it said it was doing when it analyzed the 
cumulative effect of Blanco’s experience. It “paid lip service” 
to the notion of cumulative analysis, id. at 110, stating that it 
was looking at “the past harm, considered cumulatively.” App. 
6–7. But it also said the harm was “more akin to harassment,” 
emphasizing that the events “commenced with an isolated 
incident of physical harm.” App. 7 (emphasis added). The BIA 
and IJ did not consider how the “surrounding acts of 
mistreatment” (the abduction and beating by the Honduran 
police and Blanco’s testimony regarding other LIBRE Party 
protesters who had been killed) “corroborated” the death 
threats that Blanco received. See Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 
110. Thus, as in Herrera-Reyes, “although [the agency] 
purported to consider the incidents ‘cumulatively,’ in practice 
[it] evaluated the [harm] to [Blanco] in isolation and without 
accounting for the broader campaign of intimidation, 
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harassment, and violence substantiated by the record.” Id. at 
108 (internal citations omitted). 
Although Herrera-Reyes is factually different from 
Blanco’s case, at bottom it addressed “whether and under what 
circumstances threats of violence may contribute to a 
cumulative pattern of past persecution when not coupled with 
physical harm to the asylum-seeker or her family.” Id. at 104. 
To this effect, we noted that “[i]n evaluating whether a threat 
is ‘concrete and menacing’ in the absence of physical harm . . 
. , we have considered more broadly whether surrounding acts 
of mistreatment had corroborated that threat with the ultimate 
effect of placing the petitioner’s life or liberty in peril.” Id. at 
110. 
In Herrera-Reyes, we concluded that the incidents the 
petitioner experienced “reflect[ed] an escalating pattern of 
mistreatment” that culminated in a final death threat, and that 
final death threat was “concrete and menacing” considering the 
context in which it was given. Id. at 111–12. That context was 
the fact that the petitioner was the leader and president of an 
opposition group to the Nicaraguan government who 
experienced verbal threats, the burning of her family’s home, 
the murder of her close compatriot, and the robbery of her 
workspace at gunpoint. Id. at 104, 112. 
The four death threats lodged against Blanco were, of 
course, not received in an identical context. The most 
important differences are that Blanco was not a high-level 
leader of the LIBRE Party and the record does not reflect that 
he was a close associate of the members of the LIBRE Party 
who were killed—though he did learn that some were killed 
after receiving similar threatening letters. Nevertheless, the 
incidents Blanco experienced “reflect an escalating pattern of 
mistreatment,” id. at 112, sufficient to rise to the level of 
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persecution because Blanco, unlike Herrera-Reyes, suffered 
physical harm—the November 2017 abduction and beating—
in addition to receiving threats of violence. Furthermore, 
unlike Herrera-Reyes, the death threats Blanco received were 
also directed towards Blanco’s family.  
Ultimately, while Herrera-Reyes is instructive to our 
analysis, we must remember that it addressed “under what 
circumstances threats of violence may contribute to a 
cumulative pattern of past persecution when not coupled with 
physical harm.” Id. at 104. Thus, the factual differences 
between Herrera-Reyes’s case and Blanco’s case become less 
significant when one considers that Blanco’s threats of 
violence—that contributed to a cumulative pattern of past 
persecution—were coupled with physical harm. We think it is 
appropriate to conclude that it was more important to Herrera-
Reyes’s past persecution analysis that she was a leader of her 
political movement and that she was close associates with the 
political activist who was murdered because Herrera-Reyes 
could not show any physical harm. But here, Blanco’s threats 
of violence were coupled with physical harm, and that suffices 
to establish past persecution in this case.  
* * * 
In sum, the BIA and IJ erred when they held that the 
harm Blanco experienced did not meet our legal standard for 
past persecution. Upon application of the proper standard, it is 
clear from the record that Blanco has established past 
persecution. We will remand to the BIA to consider the other 
two elements of asylum eligibility, that is, whether the 
persecution was on account of a statutorily protected ground 
and whether it was committed by the government or forces the 
government was unable or unwilling to control. 
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2. Well-founded Fear of Future Persecution 
A noncitizen who proves past persecution is “presumed 
to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the 
original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The burden then 
shifts to the Government to rebut this presumption, and it can 
do so by showing that there has been a “fundamental change in 
circumstances” or that the noncitizen “could avoid future 
persecution by relocating” to another part of his or her home 
country and “it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to 
do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A), (B), (ii). 
Because Blanco was subjected to past persecution, he 
was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear 
of future persecution. “But as the IJ erroneously found to the 
contrary and the BIA affirmed, neither determined whether the 
presumption of future persecution could be rebutted, and that 
determination lies with the agency in the first instance.” 
Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 112 (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)). 
3. Withholding of Removal  
“To qualify for withholding of removal, an alien must 
establish a ‘clear probability of persecution,’ i.e., that it is more 
likely than not, that s/he would suffer persecution upon 
returning home.” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 
582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011). “Since this standard is more 
demanding than that governing eligibility for asylum, an alien 
who fails to qualify for asylum is necessarily ineligible for 
withholding of removal.” Id. (citation omitted). The IJ and the 
BIA concluded that Blanco had not established eligibility for 
asylum because he failed to demonstrate past persecution or a 
well-founded fear of future persecution, so they summarily 
dismissed Blanco’s claim for withholding of removal. 
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Because we conclude that Blanco has established past 
persecution, we will vacate the BIA’s denial of withholding 
and remand with instructions to reconsider the claim. See 
Konan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that our review of the BIA’s decision “is limited to 
the rationale that the agency provides”). 
B. Blanco’s CAT Claim 
To establish eligibility for a mandatory grant of 
withholding or deferral of removal under the CAT, an 
applicant must prove “that it is more likely than not that he . . . 
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 
removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Torture is:  
(1) an act causing severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering; (2) intentionally 
inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed 
purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official who has custody or physical 
control of the victim; and (5) not arising 
from lawful sanctions. 
Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005). “The 
objective evidence to be considered in evaluating a CAT claim 
includes ‘[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the 
applicant;’ ‘[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of 
human rights within the country of removal;’ and ‘[o]ther 
relevant information regarding conditions in the country of 
removal.’” Id. at 134 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). 
The applicant bears the burden of proving his 
entitlement to protection under the CAT, and his testimony “if 
credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof 
without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “However, 
corroborating evidence may be required when it is reasonable 
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to expect it, such as for ‘facts [that] are central’ to a claim and 
easily verified.” Luziga v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 255 (3d 
Cir. 2019) (quoting Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 192 
(3d Cir. 2007)).  
“Before requiring corroborating evidence, i.e., deciding 
that ‘failure to corroborate undermines’ a claim, an IJ must 
follow the Abdulai inquiry.” Id. (quoting Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 
905 F.3d 729, 736 (3d Cir. 2018)). That three-part inquiry 
requires that an IJ (1) identify “the facts for which ‘it is 
reasonable to expect corroboration,’” (2) ask whether the 
applicant has corroborated them, and (3) if not, consider 
“whether the applicant has adequately explained his . . . failure 
to do so.” Id. (quoting Saravia, 905 F.3d at 736). “We have 
repeatedly held that the [BIA’s or IJ’s] failure to engage in the 
three-part inquiry described above requires that the BIA’s 
findings regarding corroboration be vacated and remanded.” 
Toure, 443 F.3d at 323; see also Luziga, 937 F.3d at 255; 
Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 136 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Here, the IJ did not engage in the three-part Abdulai 
inquiry before denying Blanco’s CAT claim on the basis that 
“there is nothing in the Country Reports to corroborate” 
Blanco’s belief that his name is on a government list of 
opposition members and he has “not provided any 
corroborating evidence.” App. 47. The BIA affirmed on the 
same basis. This was legal error. Therefore, we will vacate and 
remand for the BIA to apply the correct legal standard in the 
first instance.3 
 
3 On remand, there is also a question regarding the 
reasonableness of the demand for corroboration: 
It is obvious that one who escapes 
persecution in his or her own land will 
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IV. Conclusion 
For these reasons, we will grant the petition for review 
of Blanco’s asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT claims, 
vacate the BIA’s order, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Because we conclude that Blanco 
has established past persecution, on remand, the BIA should 
consider the remaining elements of asylum eligibility (whether 
the persecution was on account of a statutorily protected 
ground and whether it was committed by the government or 
forces the government was unable or unwilling to control) and 
whether he was entitled to withholding of removal. In addition, 
the BIA should reevaluate whether Blanco was entitled to relief 
under the CAT 
 
rarely be in a position to bring documentary 
evidence or other kinds of corroboration to 
support a subsequent claim for asylum. It is 
equally obvious that one who flees torture 
at home will rarely have the foresight or 
means to do so in a manner that will 
enhance the chance of prevailing in a 
subsequent court battle in a foreign land. 
Common sense establishes that it is escape 
and flight, not litigation and corroboration, 
that is foremost in the mind of an alien who 
comes to these shores fleeing detention, 
torture and persecution. 
Toure, 443 F.3d at 324 (quoting Senathirajah v. I.N.S., 157 
F.3d 210, 215–16 (3d Cir. 1998)). The agency should take 
these principles into account when performing the Abdulai 
inquiry. 
